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Abstract:  this paper examines the political-economy and cultural dynamics and discourses underlying the 
emergence of the Palestinian Hamas and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front.  Both movements emerged in 
the late 1980s as responses to continuing (neo) colonial conditions in their countries.  I explore to what extent 
the various processes commonly referred to as “globalization,” both the world-wide economic 
transformations epitomized by post-fordism on the macro/system level and neo-liberal structural adjustment 
programs within countries, and—perhaps more important—its cultural dynamics contributed to the rise and 
power of both movements.   
  I examine the socio-economic situation in Algeria and Palestine-Israel during the 1980s and link it to the 
politics developments in both countries.  Next I review the events behind the founding of both movements 
and the main components of their ideologies and strategies.  Finally I explore their arguments to determine 
whether the political-economic or cultural pressures unleashed by globalization were the determining factor 
in their emergence and ideological development.   
  I conclude by comparing the two case studies to determine if there are common threads that can serve as 
the basis for a region-wide investigation of the role of globalization in the emergence and/or rise to social 
hegemony of Islamist movements in other MENA countries. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
“Israeli cultural imperialism is a greater threat to Palestinians than economic or military 
occupation.” 
 
In the context of the ever deepening violence of the last two years, this statement, made by a senior 
Hamas representative in the late 1990s, recalls a time when peace between Palestinians and 
Israelis—or at least a “hudna,” or truce in Hamas’s Islamic terminology—seemed possible.  This 
was also the time of Shimon Peres’ “New Middle East,” which sought to place a peaceful Israel as 
the economic and cultural engine of a globalized region based on an American neo-liberal 
  1consumerist vision.  And it was the era of Tel Aviv as “world-city,” when the tens of thousands of 
“illegal” Romanian, Thai or Nigerian workers seemed more problematic than the seemingly waning 
conflict.   
  Yet however remote cultural issues seem from today’s clear-cut political violence on both 
sides, an analysis of the ideology and policies of Hamas, and its counterparts in the Jewish-Israeli 
society, reflect the enduring impact of the reshaping of public discourses of identity, justice and 
morality in both societies.  My research seeks to explore the cultural dimension behind the birth and 
rise to prominence of the Islamically motivated and determined politics as exemplified by the 
Islamic Resistance Movement, or Hamas.  My hypothesis, drawn from my larger comparative 
project on Muslim and European cultural experiences of and responses to globalization, is that the 
conglomeration of phenomena commonly known as globalization have played an important role in 
shaping the dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict during the 1980s through today (as in other 
contemporaneous developments in the Middle East), and that by examining both the writings of 
Hamas leaders, along with the latest critical sociological and anthropological literature on the 
movement, we can determine the extent of the role played by economic, political and cultural 
aspects of globalization on the movement’s development and activities.  I argue that such an 
investigation is crucial to understanding the larger issue of how socio-religious movements are 
challenging secular nation-state orders in the MENA region. 
  My specific goal in this paper is to review the history and primary literature of Hamas and 
then compare it to the history and ideology of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front, which was born 
at approximately the same time as Hamas, whose existence seems to have greatly encouraged the 
founders of the Palestinian movement, and which itself seems to have been responding to changes 
in the political and cultural economies of Algerian society of the 1980s.  Indeed, this was a period 
when increasing political and economic weakness of the Algerian State, in good measure as a result 
of World Bank/IMF-imposed SAP-austerity programs, led to some of the first anti-globalization 
riots in the world, in the fall of 1988.   
  I believe that despite the myriad differences in the contexts in which they each emerged and 
operate(d), a comparison of these two movements will reveal important commonalities in responses 
to the expanding impact of world-wide neoliberal reforms that would soon be referred to as the 
engine driving contemporary globalization.  Moreover, my analysis attempts to challenge the 
portrayal of Islamist discourse, and particularly religious discourse within Palestine, as “simplistic” 
and not relying on “reasoned thought,” but rather focused on prescribing an “ideal, even monistic 
society” that characterizes so much of the literature on these issues.
1 
    As I have yet to obtain the majority of the primary sources I need for an in depth review of 
the two movements’ writings (including the majority of the Hamas leaflets and the major FIS 
newspapers and other publications), this paper will rely on a review of the secondary research and 
primary documents I have already collected.  Through this comparison I hope to lay the 
groundwork for a more detailed analysis of the interrelationship between the world-wide economic 
transformations of the mid to late 1980s, and their impact on the politics and cultures of Algeria and 
Palestine/Israel.  In so doing my research raises new questions about the relationship between 
  2economy and culture in the transformations of public spheres in the MENA region in the era of 
late/globalized capitalism. 
 
I. The Political-Economy of the MENA Region on the Eve of Insurrection 
It is a commonplace to say that the late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed rapid and intensive 
transformation in the political economy of the MENA region, as the combination of tremendous oil 
price increases and subsequent reductions, along with the Iranian Revolution, permanently changed 
the dynamics in the region.  How did these events play out vis-à-vis our two cases studies?  To 
begin with Palestine/Israel, the early 1980s saw a rapid growth of the Islamic movement in the 
Occupied Territories, one which has yet to be adequately studied.  The causes of this phenomenon 
were clearly both external and internal: the Iranian Revolution, the plunge of oil prices and 
subsequent recession in the Gulf states which were a primary source of remittances back to 
Palestine, and at the same time a significant decrease in the demand for labor migrants, many of 
whom were Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza.  Of course, the Israeli economy also 
affected the lives of Palestinians: it was severely shaken by the 1983 stock market crises, saw 
soaring triple-digit inflation by the mid-1980s, followed by the constraints imposed by the Israeli 
government or by free-market forces on the Palestinian economy, all of which deleteriously 
impacted the social and economic conditions in the West Bank and Gaza.  
  Indeed, from the outset it can be determined that the political/territorial considerations that 
are usually judged to be of primary importance to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are not the only 
factors determining the rise of Hamas: “The fact of displacement alone can be sufficient for joining 
a movement which aims to redress this wrong.  Even without the religious connotation of alienation 
from the homeland, there is a loss of livelihood, property and heritage which are sufficient in 
themselves to make the Hamas movement attractive to those who have suffered them.”
2   
  A similar situation was being played out in Algeria during the same period.  As John 
Esposito explained vis-à-vis Algeria, if its first war was one of political independence, the current 
civil war is a “war of identity,” one which was based on a “new form of cultural protest.”
3 Once the 
Civil War, or “fitna,” began in 1992, the further slide of the economy fueled further violence.  It is 
clear that the economic situation in Algeria was a primary factor for either the “rupture” or 
“evolution” of events that occurred in October 1988.   
  Algeria’s economic transformation in the 1980s was ostensibly designed to achieve the 
“self-reliance” called for in itsNational Charter.  Yet while reaffirming fundamental socialist 
principles of Algeria’s socialist legacy, the reality was that the “state-building national companies,” 
which were fed by the development plans of the previous decades, were broken up and 
decentralized.
5  These enterprises, it needs be remembered, were constructed in the aftermath of 
independence, in a largely vain attempt to reduce the colonial era dependence on France, which saw 
more than 80% of the agricultural output exported for the latter’s benefit.
6  While per capita income 
in none of the Maghrebian countries fared very well in the 1970s-1990s, Algeria’s PCI saw its 
growth drop from 7.6% annual growth in the 1970-75 period to 4.6% in the 198-85 period and 
decrease to -5.5% in the 1985-95 period.
7 
  3  An August 1986 law liberalized the hydrocarbon sector in an effort to encourage foreign 
exploration and investment, as the country could no longer afford a socialist path. The problem was 
the steep slump in oil prices, and both the State’s ideology and the economy were sliding toward the 
brink of bankruptcy in a situation where the only constant was “the latent insurrectionary character 
of the Algerian people.”
8  In this context plummeting oil prices, in the context where Algeria was 
importing sixty percent of its food, and a macroeconomic policy linked to unhelpful gas price 
policies, helped to plunge the Algerian economy into a deep recession, which forced the usual 
austerity and mounting debt measures.  Thus Algeria’s hydrocarbon industry revenues dropped 40 
percent in 1986 and foreign debt rose to $17 billion in 1987, while economic growth dropped 
precipitously.
9   
  At the same time the average Algerian, especially those with memories of the struggle for 
independence and the values that inspired it, were disgusted with Benjedid’s “capitalism for the 
privileged” that was umbilically tied to France.
10  Ultimately this precarious situation led to a series 
of strikes beginning in late September, and then “riots” in October 1988.  This forced rapid 
democratic and constitutional reforms, which were supposed to end the FLN’s monopoly of power; 
and indeed this period did witness the flowering—albeit fleeting—of artistic and intellectual 
creativity whose goal was the existential task of defining or describing the nation.  At the same 
time, however, this process led to the success of the FIS, the Front Islamique du Salut in local 
elections in June 1990 and in the first round of parliamentary elections in December 1991.   
  Fearful an Islamist takeover—or in the words of one former FIS parliamentarian, fearful of 
an assumption of real political power by anyone other than them
11—the military and civilian elites 
overthrew the Benjedid Government in January 1992, leading to the take-over of power by a “Haut 
Comité d’Etat,” and the paving of the road to a decade long “fitna,” or “trial.”  
  What is important to realize is that “while the riots stemmed from economic pressures, but 
they were deeply rooted in political, social, and cultural frustration.”
12  Thus we must understand 
the relationship between the deteriorating economic conditions since 1985—depressed oil prices, 
unemployment, food shortages, surging inflation—and the suffocated aspirations of an entire 
younger generation, as more than half the population was under twenty-one.  As Naylor explains, 
the youth that took to the streets in 1988 were “existentially alienated” from the FLN’s modernist-
socialist imagination of Algeria, and the FIS specifically addressed the sentiments and needs 
generated by such estrangement. 
  The Benjedid regime realized this, as it met with the leaders of the incipient FIS in October 
1988, which reflected the movement’s cultural significance and political legitimacy.  Yet the 
economy continued to “deconstruct,” as foreign investment and loans, especially in the banking 
sector, were accelerated and existing strict investment codes dating back to the early post-
independence era were relaxed.  Naturally, the IMF approved of these moves, and granted Algeria 
further credit in 1991, in conjunction with grants and other interventions by the World Bank, the 
Arab Monetary Fund and French banks. 
  However, both reform and aid programs failed ultimately because the system could not be 
changed with the same men and institutions in power, whose natural inclination was to resist such 
change, as it would threaten their power.
13  This of course led to even greater French involvement 
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against Algerians in France in the wake of the 1989 head scarf affair and continuing discrimination 
against harkis and beurs.  
  It is clear, then, that the economic reforms of the 1980s were in line with the world trends of 
Thatcherism, and thus included a marginalization of agriculture and greater unemployment and the 
loss of control of the state institutions without their replacement with more efficient administration, 
and an aggravation of social tensions.  Under the Chadli regime of the late 1980s there was a clear 
attempt by the young technocracts to implement free market liberalization-development plans and 
to grow even closer to France.
14  After the coup of 1992 this was exacerbated by the military 
Government’s relationship with a French Government whose goal was a “return to colonial 
methods.”
15  Such policies, not surprisingly, helped Algeria to receive numerous IMF/World Bank 
loans in the midst of the civil war. 
  The specific combination of socialist rhetoric-cum-policy as the defining ideology of the 
Algerian State on the one hand, with the practical implementation of liberalization-cum-
privatization programs on the ground, had a determinative impact—no doubt in good measure 
because of the social and political confusion it caused—on the return to Islam in Algeria.  That is, at 
the same time the more conservative agricultural class, especially the land-owners, reacted against 
the so-called socialist policies of the state in agriculture (which included land reform and 
redistribution),
16 while the rapid shift to neo-liberal policies further estranged (other sections of) the 
population.  
  Indeed, “religion is not solely a cult of God and allegiance to the established authority.  It 
can serve as the expression of malcontentment and an instrument in the struggle in the hands of all 
those excluded from the benefits of the political system,” and also in response to political and 
economic factors, notably to the loss of petroleum revenues and the attendant economic downfall; 
altogether which led to an “accumulation of political, economic and cultural frustrations” that 
together led to the “explosion of October 1988.”
18 
 
What is most important for our purposes is that the same time that the economy slid into a 
downward spiral “resurgent, and ultimately insurgent Islamism” was becoming the main opposition 
to the Pouvoir.
19  Like the PLO/PA in the Occupied Territories, postcolonial Algerian governments 
always affirmed their allegiance to Islam, especially for “preserving Algeria’s personality” during 
the colonial period.
20  Yet if the official ideology tried to synthesize secularism, socialism and 
Islam, already in the 1960s Islamist groups questioned the viability and permissibility of this 
combination.  However, it wasn’t just Western ideas that were suspect: while early Islamist leaders 
such as Malek Bennabi questioned Algeria’s attachment to Western ideas (even Fanonism), he was 
just as critical of their willingness to “ingest Muslim ideas imported from foreign sources like 
Egypt’s MB,” as being unable to help them rid themselves of their “colonisabilité” that was fueled 
by the West’s corrosive materialism and lack of spirituality.
21   
  In a situation where an ideologically confused State was clearly responsible for the 
economic and cultural “misfortunes of the popular masses” the FIS offered an attractive alternative 
to politically excluded an alienated Algerians because it had a “spiritual discourse” that argued that 
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22  Yet what is 
most interesting about this situation in Algeria, as Hugh Roberts explains, is that despite the myriad 
economic problems facing the country  the Algerian Islamist movement, including the FIS, in fact 
had little of anything to say about economic matters.  Not even a paeon to Islamic banking nor any 
attempt to address “bread and butter” issues of its constituents.
23  Indeed, “at a time when Algeria’s 
Islamists… were apparently bidding for power in conditions of unprecedented national economic 
crisis and controversy, they not only evacuated the entire debate over the future direction of the 
country’s economic development, but did so at the expense of the interests of the urban poor whom 
they were committed to mobilizing, by supporting the positions of the FLN Government and party 
leadership in [the] debate [over the economy].”
24 
 
Ultimately, the economic transformations that affected Palestinian and Algerian societies must be 
contextualized vis-à-vis the socio-economic characteristics of the membership of the two 
movements.  I still have much research to do on this issue, but from the data I have gathered, the 
following preliminary conclusions can be drawn:  To begin with Hamas, its socio-economic 
characteristics mirror those of its parent organization, the MB.  That is, most of its adherents came 
initially (and seem to come still today) from small towns and villages, or recently migrated to a 
larger city, and from the ranks of the lower middle class and first generation of college educated 
professionals in the natural sciences or law.  It is almost a cliché to say that they experienced some 
sort of modernization process from which they did not benefit to the degree their education and 
talents would have led them to believe, and thus they became embittered with the secular 
nationalist-modernist discourses coming from Israel and the Arab world alike.  And this task 
specifically put the Gazan-based Hamas in conflict with the existing, mostly middle class West 
Bank situated indigenous or “Tunis”-based leadership, which often came from the cities or at least 
large towns.    
  Similarly, many if not most of the leaders and cadres of FIS came from lower 
middle/working class backgrounds, with “secular” educations in the sciences, medicine and law.  
They thus did not come from elite religious families and did not have the institutional support (and 
specifically had no recognized Algerian counterpart to Egypt’s al-Azhar), and thus constituted a 
block of people with an education that prepared them for careers whose rewards the political and 
economic situation in Algeria would not allow them to realize.  Yet perhaps to an even greater 
degree than Hamas, FIS’ leadership was educated in and through Europe, and was thoroughly 
familiar with Western culture even if ideologically most members were not comfortable with many 
aspects.  But the familiarity likely contributed to a level of moderation that is absent in Hamas, a 
subject to which I now turn. 
 
II. The Formation of Hamas and the Main Components of its Ideology 
However important culture was and remains to the Hamas worldview and motivations, the fact 
remains that at heart it has always been a movement of violent resistance against occupation.  Thus 
in one of its first bayanat, or leaflets, Hamas argues that “it is necessary that the Jews understand: 
despite their chains, their prisons and their detention centers… despite the ordeals that our people 
  6are enduring under their criminal occupation… the uprising of our ‘murabit” people on this 
occupied territory constitutes the manifestation of rejecting the occupation and its pressures.. 
rejecting the politics of expropriation of land and the creation of settlements… rejection of the 
politics of repression conducted by the Zionists.”
25  Nor was there a clear cultural component to the 
“14 points of actions” agreed upon by the leaders of the “national Institutions” in late 1987 (?).
26   
  On the other hand, when one reads consistent religious references, such as to “Muslims in 
the land of the night voyage of the Prophet,” or “Descenants of Ja’far and of Abu Abayda, and the 
dcalling of fellow citizens “murabitun,” it is clear that culture is a central component and driving 
force in their “thematic and problematic.”
27  Or when they claim that Jews “killed the prophets, they 
massacred the innocents, they imprisoned the God-fearing…” such language is ultimately and 
profoundly cultural;
28 it relates to the clear “eschatological” language of Hamas texts, at least of the 
first year of the intifada.
29   
  My research to date suggests that in the same way that PLO reshaped the goals and 
strategies of Palestinian society, Hamas also, beginning in the late 1980s “so[wed] the seeds for a 
markedly significant political transformation in the society.”
30  In order to have such an effect it is 
clear that it was more than just the ultra-violent religious movement it is normally depicted to be—
although it is surely that too; indeed, such a monolithic characterization, focused solely on the 
violence, are a “crude reduction” of a very complicated situation.
31  Moreover, it is specifically the 
combination of extreme violence and socio-political power and position that make Hamas so 
interesting.   
  It is clear that while the “return to Islam” among Palestinians was a response to (failed) 
secularization (as in other countries), a move “away from the mosque to the cinema,” its was just as 
much a response to specifically political events, such as the defeat of the PLO in Lebanon in 1982.
32  
And one could see that whereas the PLO, and specifically Fatah, stressed “national liberation” as its 
raison d’etre, Hamas described itself as struggling in order to defend the “Muslim person, Islamic 
culture, and Muslim holy sites…”
33 
  Then how did the ground become so fertile for its rapid growth?  Like FIS vis-à-vis the 
unfinished business of decolonization in Algeria, Hamas “constitute[d] a new link in the chain of 
Palestinian struggle.”
34  Like most socio-religious movements, a close scrutiny of Hamas’ roots and 
activities since its establishment at the outbreak of the first uprising in December 1987 reveals it to 
be essentially a social movement, one whose larger goal and strategy was a “return to Islam” that 
was envisioned as an evolutionary process to be achieved by means of comprehensive education 
aimed at everyone, from infants to the uneducated elderly.  As such, until the recent all out war 
against Israel, Hamas has directed much of its energies and resources toward providing services to 
the wider Palestinian society; its particularly religious focus helped it become deeply rooted in the 
society in manner where it has been able to mirror, express and tend to its anxieties, concerns, 
aspirations, needs and difficulties.
35 
  Yet it is equally clear that Hamas, whose military wing is specifically named after Izz-al-Din 
al-Qassem, took inspiration from his anti-colonial philosophy that was clearly drawn from his 
experience studying in Egypt and his exposure to and following of the thinking of al-Banna, Rida 
and al-Afghani.
36  His focus on morality was ultimately taken up by Ham Amin Husseini, when he 
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country.
37  In this context the movement’s semiofficial history points to 1967 as the date of its 
genesis, with a four-stage process of evolution: 1) 1967–1976: Construction of the “hard core” of 
the MB in the Gaza Strip in the face of oppressive Israeli rule; 2)1976–1981: Geographical 
expansion through participation in professional associations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 
and institution building, notably al-Mujamma‘ al-islami (Islamic Center, Gaza), al-Jam‘iyya al-
islamiyya, and the Islamic University in Gaza (for the purposes of our discussion, the establishment 
of these centers is the most crucial moment…); 3) 1981–1987: Political influence through 
establishment of the mechanisms of action and preparation for armed struggle; and 4) 1987: 
Founding of Hamas as the combatant arm of the MB in Palestine and the launching of a continuing 
jihad.
38 
  What is important to realize, and what has helped shape the belief in many quarters that the 
establishment of Hamas and its development were encouraged and even financially supported by 
Israel, was the support of the Occupation authorities for the doubling of the number of mosques in 
Gaza from 1967 to 1986 (from 77 to 150), and the further rapid increase to 200 by 1989.  More 
important, most of the new mosques were private, independent of the religious waqf establishment 
in the Strip and thus independent from the direct influence of the Israeli state.  (A similar process 
occurred in Algeria, as I explain below.) 
  Such a rapid growth in the number of mosques reflects a genuine increase in religious 
identification and practice by Palestinian society at large.  Thus we need to understand the rise of 
Hamas within the context of two processes; one related to internal dynamics of Palestinian society 
vis-à-vis the ongoing struggle against Israel and the place of Islamists within that struggle, and the 
other the larger phenomenon of so-called “political Islam” in the larger MENA region.
39  More 
specifically, we need to examine the synthesis of these two phenomena at the same moment there 
was a synthesis of the previously opposed tendencies toward either education or militancy (i.e., 
armed struggle versus social change) as the main strategies for the Islamic movement in Palestine.  
  That is, before the intifada, the MB gave priority to an “internal jihad” in the Muslim 
community over an “external jihad” against Israel and the West, which they felt needed to be 
postponed until the establishment of an Islamic state that could assume responsibility for it.  
Moreover, As Mishal and Shela point out, since Israel’s very existence was the result of the 
abandonment of Islamic norms, only when the Islamization of society was completed, the shari‘a 
fully implemented, and preparations for a long armed struggle were completed would Muslims be 
capable of defeating Israel. The MB’s passive approach to the armed struggle against Israel drew 
fire from the nationalist Palestinian factions, which accused the MB of collaborating with Israel. 
This criticism, combined with the violence launched by Islamic Jihad against Israel and the growing 
number of young Islamic activists imprisoned by Israel, caused younger and more militant members 
of the MB to press the veteran leaders to take up arms against Israel.
40 
  Crucial to this process, and what makes the Hamas phenomenon so interesting and complex 
is that around 1986 the MB established a security arms, called the Organization of Jihad and Da‘wa 
(Munazzamat al-jihad wal-da‘wa), abbreviated Majd (literally, glory).  As its name suggests, its 
goal was both continuing the internal jihad within Palestinian society through the imposition of 
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pornographers, etc.) and undertaking intelligence gathering and violent activities against suspected 
collaborators.  Indeed, Majd was headed by Salah Shihadah, a well-known preacher, who was in 
charge of student affairs at the Islamic University in Gaza, thus demonstrating the strong link 
between educational/public activities and the growing use of violence by the movement.  What I 
am trying to understand, and need to do more work on, is how to theorize this.  Any thoughts 
would be greatly appreciated… 
 
Because of the historical foundation of Hamas within the Palestinian MB, it is important to 
understand how the actions of the Palestinian MB influenced the character and actions of Hamas.  I 
cannot recount the lengthy history here, but to move closer to the present, we must remember that 
during the period of Jordanian rule in the West Bank the MB became close to the Jordanian 
regime—indeed, “there was a strong identification with the Hashemite regime”—while at the same 
time they did not invest the time to develop their own Palestinian brand of Islamic ideology, which 
made the Qutubian strand that much more important.
41  Indeed, even in the late 1960s, and after the 
Israeli conquest of the remainder of Palestine, in the 1970s, it was the fedayyin and not the 
mujahidin that lad the struggle, and even in Gaza the MB was “unable to offer Gazans a viable 
alternative to the philosophy of Fedayeen struggle…”
42 And once the Israelis took over, the MB 
was quite willing to work with the Israelis and even take money from them.  We need to understand 
why that would be?  Why it would be that MB members would be so against the “nationalists” and 
secularists that they would threaten them, attack them, burn them with acid, even kill them but at 
the same time would work with the Israelis all those years? 
  A clear answer has to be that the threat of cultural contamination and “weakness” inside 
Palestinian society was viewed as a far greater threat than continued Occupation, since the latter 
was clearly not going to end soon, and indeed would never until such Islamic reform of the society 
took root.  And so it was only when the nationalist movement “was broken” that the Islamic 
movement began to reemerge.
43  Until this time, which is considered to have begun with the 
evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon, the Mujamma‘ clearly worked with Israel, and Yassin often 
met with Israeli intelligence and other officials…
44  His philosophy is based on al-Banna’s belief in 
the importance of education and preaching as the key to civilizational rebirth in Islam through the 
Islamization of society.
45  Beyond education however, in the Covenant of Hamas al-Banna is quoted 
as saying that “Israel exists and will continue to exist until Islam abrogates it as it abrogated that 
which preceded it.”
46  Indeed, the Mujamma‘ had a “conservative-reformist” approach that was 
more “Muslim than Palestinian” and used the work of al-Banna and Qutb rather than develop its 
own philosophy.
47 
  It was this circumstance in which the 1980s was the period in which “Islam was reasserted 
in Palestinian society both the continued provision by a vast range of important social and 
educational services and also, more disturbingly, through the use of force, beatings, public hate 
campaigns and acid attacks…”
48  thus they went after faculty because they were “communist and 
immoral,” which are clearly cultural issues… and must be understood in light of the fact that the 
Mujamma‘ didn’t even have Palestine on their radar.
49  Thus “liberation through education” was a 
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any secular faculty was accused of being “atheists.”
50 
  If we look specifically at the Mujamma‘, it focused on communal activity that related to its 
local Gaza base which allowed it to respond to the needs of its constituents:  “Al-Mujamma‘ 
provided civil services that constituted an effective network combining a social infrastructure, 
political protection, and a popular basis.  This network functioned as a parallel system to the absent, 
or meager, Israeli occupation services, which had been particularly lacking in the Gaza Strip’s 
refugee camps, whose population comprised more than half the population in this territory. The 
necessity for such civil services was doubly acute because since the late 1970s, the Israeli military 
government had gradually reduced its social and economic investments in the Palestinian 
infrastructure in the occupied territories.”
51  On the other hand, the image of the Mujamma‘ as an 
institution focusing on religious and social activities apparently well served the Islamic trend in the 
Gaza Strip, which could gather public support without appearing to threaten the PLO’s hegemonic 
position among the Palestinians.
52  What this fact leads me to wonder is how to explore this 
unofficial, in many ways “illegal” public sphere—can there be such a thing?—in relation to 
both the traditional Habermasian notion of the public sphere and the more recent critiques 
by, inter alia, Salvatore, et al, in which as I explore below, the religiously organized (or 
dominated) public sphere is the handmaiden of the State’s capturing of the minds and bodies 
of its (proto) citizens. 
 
  Eight months after the intifada started, in August 1988, Hamas presented an Islamic 
platform that blatantly appropriated the PLO’s national values, as set forth in its charter, cast in 
Islamic terminology and the Islamic belief system.  We can interpret this Charter as effectively 
proclaiming the PLO’s charter as null and void, asserting its replacement by “a true covenant that 
was uncompromisingly faithful to both Palestinian national principles and Islamic beliefs and 
values.”  Here we see the moment from which the larger project on the challenge of socio-religious 
movements to secular states begins, as the Charter reiterates the MB’s slogan of “Allah is its goal, 
the Prophet is the model, the Qur’an its constitution, jihad its path, and death for the sake of Allah 
its most sublime belief” (article 8).  Moreover, in fighting to liberate all of Palestine, the entire 
country is described as a whole and indivisible and defined as an Islamic waqf (endowment) 
“consecrated for future Muslim generations until Judgment Day” (article 11), which therefore 
prohibits the yielding of any land to non-Muslim sovereignty.  Thus we are not just dealing with a 
sacred polity but a sacralized space too.  Indeed, as Mishal and Shela argue, this article epitomized 
the Islamic movement’s ripening process of territorialization, shifting from a pan-Islamic to a 
national-Palestinian movement. 
  Yet culture was crucial to this process.  If we compare Hamas to FIS, both emerged “in the 
midst of very complicated political, psychological, economic and social conditions;”
53 yet while the 
FIS emerged out of a failed but at least formally completed process decolonization, Hamas was 
born in the heart of resistance against an ongoing occupation.  Moreover, unlike FIS, Hamas has 
never enjoyed an outright majority of popular support; indeed, it decided not to run candidates in—
  10although it did not actively oppose—the 1996 Palestinian elections, and at least before the outbreak 
of the 2000 intifada its support seemed to hover between 30-40%.   
  There are other important differences in the evolution of the two movements.  Ideologically 
and historically, Hamas grew out of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had 
been operating in the country since the late 1930s (the first “genuine” Palestinian MB organization 
was formed in 1943 in Jerusalem)
54 and played an active though limited role in the 1948 war.  A 
major turning point was the aftermath of the war, when the WB and Gaza came under Jordanian and 
Egyptian rule.  While the MB’s relations with Nasser foreclosed a strong public role in the Gaza 
Strip, in the WB the MB developed fairly close relations with the monarchy, and because they did 
not advocate military activities against Israel from the WB they were officially recognized by the 
Jordanian Government and contested elections.   
  What is crucial about this relationship is that it led the MB to remain on the sidelines in 
terms of military activities against Israel even after the 1967 war.  Instead, the MB, true to its roots 
as a mass-based social-educational movement, and in contrast to the more militant Qutubian version 
that gained popularity elsewhere in the Arab/Muslim worlds, worked to build its infrastructure and 
organization within Palestinian society.  Rather, it refrained from engagement in violence during the 
1960s and 1970s on the basis of “preparing the liberation generation,”
55 a clearly cultural-
educational model.  The goal of such preparation was “to launch a comprehensive effort at cultural 
renaissance designed to instill true Islam in the soul of the individual and, following that 
renaissance, to embark on the path of liberation.”
56   
  It is important to point out that these words herald from a book titled Singposts Along Road 
to the Liberation of Palestine, a clear allusion to Sayyed Qutb’s more activist/militant philosophy.  
The less confrontational policies of the MB did cost it significant open support during the 1970s and 
1980s, when secular nationalist ideologies were dominant, but its choice of locations such as 
universities, school and mosques, and its use of lecturing, preaching and distributing literature as the 
main vehicles for disseminating its message, paid off in the long run, especially after the outbreak 
of the intifada in December 1987.  Thus “the already existing structure of the MB was a tremendous 
asset to Hamas.  Instead of expending much effort and considerable time on organizational matters, 
they found in the Brotherhood a convenient base, a benefit not enjoyed by other movements.
57 
  In fact, the lack of violent activities by the MB had already led to the splintering of the 
organization and the creation of Islamic Jihad by disgruntled members during the early 1980s.  This 
development greatly disturbed the leadership of the Palestinian MB; yet until the intifada exploded 
the leadership stuck with their focus on the overall religious mission of spreading its message 
through Islamic teachings and education, which “somewhat subsumed the underlying political 
concerns of the people.  The ‘liberation of Palestine’ in the mind of the Brotherhood was to be 
considered only after liberating the people socially, or only after returning them to the ‘right path’ 
of Islam.”
58  Such a program is crucial to me because it demonstrates that a cultural politics, or what 
Michel Foucault terms a “spiritual politics,” is at the heart of the mission of the MB, and therefore 
is at the kernel of Hamas’ program even if on paper it was superceded by a more activist/violent 
program. 
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the first six months of its existence.  This is not surprising since the people who formed Hamas, like 
the founders of the Islamic Jihad, had come to despair of the passivist/quietist policy of the MB and 
were insistent on forming Hamas even without notifying their elderly leaders.  Whatever the oedipal 
conflict, the combination of the strong foundations on the grassroots level established by decades of 
MB work and the power of Hamas’ activities from the start of the intifada were a potent mixture 
that ensured its quick rise to prominence.   
  Moreover, the ties between Hamas and the MB were undeniable, and it thus it is 
reasonable to assume that the ideology of Hamas regarding the importance and role of culture must 
be considered in the context of the MB.  Indeed, Sheikh Ahmad Yasin studied in Egypt during the 
1960s, where he was no doubt deeply influenced by Qutb’s writings and death.  The most powerful 
Sunni Islamist voices of the second half of the twentieth century, Qutb was the leader of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood executed by the Nassir Government in 1966.
59 
Qutb spent several years in the United States in the 1950s, and his experience of endemic 
racism, poverty amidst affluence, and non-segregated gender relations cemented an abhorrence of 
the West, and the United States in particular, that had predated his sojourn there.  But there is no 
doubt that his time in the United States hardened Qutb’s belief that capitalism and democracy were 
inseparable from each other—an understanding of this relationship in which both discourses used 
culture to divide the world.
60 
Islam, then, was the one system that could bring “complete social justice.”  In order to 
achieve this goal “exploitative capitalism” would have to be divested of its ownership of political 
and economic power, while the Islam that would replace it would have to be more than “merely a 
veil for inciting the masses” (this was Qutb’s evaluation of socialism, a system that he felt was 
unable to resolve the conflict between the individual and society).
61  Only an Islamic system, one in 
which sovereignty belonged not to man but to God (hakimiyyah), would realize the best ideals of 
both socialism and Christianity, which he felt had become locked inside the church and far removed 
from daily life.
62 
It is a measure of how the terms of the debate have changed that few Islamist critics of 
capitalism today equate the two and conceive of democracy negatively.  But for Qutb, rejecting 
democracy in favor of the “sovereignty of God” (hakimiyyah) was the only possible way to confront 
capitalism by moving the focus away from humanity and material needs and towards worship of 
God.   
  If I can return to the question of how the MB movement in Palestine transitioned from a 
focus on da‘wa to violence, a possible line of inquiry comes from the fact that the members of 
Hamas come from a class of people that are “enlightened but alienated from enlightenment,” not 
least because of the consequences of the Occupation.
63  Yet they remain fully modern—as 
Eisenstadt has argued, they are quintessentially Jacobin-modern—yet they reject much of the 
modernist political framework in favor of the utopian Qutubist vision.  Indeed, Article 7 of the 
Charter explains that Hamas is an “international movement… it is prepared for this task because of 
the clarity of its ideology, its lofty goal and the sanctity of its objectives… whoever closes his eyes 
from seeing reality, unintentionally or intentionally, will one day awake to find that the world has 
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is for those who are early.”  Moreover, if we recall Bauman’s critiques of modernity as inherently 
productive of violence and non-recognition of Others, it becomes quite clear that the turn toward 
violence was not an aberration but a natural evolution of its Jacobin-utopian perspective.   
 
III. The Formation of the Islamic Salvation Front and the Main Components of its Ideology 
To consider the socio-political roots of FIS’ rise to power, we can imagine what Palestine might 
have been like in twenty-five years if the Oslo process was successful (from an Israeli and elite 
Palestinian perspective), and a largely corrupt and nepotistic “state” composed of the inheritors of 
the current generation of PA leaders ruled the country, who had more in common with their former 
Israeli rulers and now close advisors than with their own mass of people.  If to this sad picture we 
add billions of barrels of oil whose profits were not utilized for the larger benefit of the nation we 
can begin to understand what motivated the creation of the Fis. 
  Like Hamas, the FIS was born out of a failed process of decolonization.  Indeed, one of the 
primary goals of the FIS was to “decolonize France from the heads of Algerians,” a process that 
was necessitated by the fact that even after almost three decades of independence the mind-set of 
Algeria’s ruling elite was more attuned to France and its strategic, economic and cultural interests 
than to their own population.  In fact, culture was central to French colonialism in Algeria right to 
the bitter end; thus in 1955 the French governor-general Jacques Soustelle declared Algeria an 
“exceptional situation” that obligated France first and foremost to better the country’s educational 
system, which would be achieved by having “cultural mission” that would “assault ignorance” and 
ultimately lead to a “conversion of spirits,” no doubt to full-fledged francofonisme of the Algerian 
heart.
64 
  However, unlike Hamas, which grew out of the long history of the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB) and had decades of experience and roots in Palestinian society to draw upon, the FIS 
developed very quickly and in an ad hoc manner.  On the other hand, le FIS’ roots lie in an equal, 
perhaps even deeper level of violence in the horrific French repression that began after the Sétif 
uprising in 1945 and continued through to independence in 1962.  No society that is born out of 
such violence emerges unscarred; even more so when those who lead the nation to independence 
became little more than a “hizb faransa,” or “party of France” by the time of independence.
65 
  Yet despite the difference in pedigree, both movements used spectacular events to launch 
them to prominence.  Thus FIS used the economic crises of the mid-to-late 1980s to gain adherents, 
Hamas used the intifada of December 1987, and then the deportation of 415 members by Israel to a 
south-Lebanon no-man’s land in December 1992, to attain worldwide notoriety and in the latter 
case even sympathy. 
 
Before proceeding further in this discussion we must confront the charge by Hugh Roberts that the 
entire program of FIS was an “opportunistic” adoption of populist slogans that in fact masked an 
institutional support for the neo-liberal policies of the Chadli regime.
66  He moreover charges that 
(and an analysis of the FIS program would seem to support his contention) that FIS both ignored the 
working class it was supposed to represent and tacitly accepted the neo-liberal reforms of the 
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67  This may indeed be the case, but my concern is not as much with 
the internal contradictions of FIS’s program as much as it is with the public rhetoric that its 
constituents clearly found appealing in a situation in which “the sense of desperation was vast;” 
particularly after three attempts at reform during the 1980s that were neo-liberal in form and very 
much in line with WB/IMF recommendations and which significantly worsed the situation for the 
average Algerian.
68  Thus, I would say this situation demonstrates that economic issues were 
transformed into cultural issues, a dynamic that is in line with other research I have conducted 
which demonstrates that in the MENA region the economic processes commonly understood as 
driving globalization are not occurring to a comparable extent to the cultural processes of 
globalization.
69 
  One important point in examining the origin of FIS and its ideology is that Algeria does not 
have the type of autonomous and hierarchical theological-academic body such as Egypt’s Al-Azhar 
or Tunisia’s al-Zitouna University, and that the post-colonial Algerian state tried to create a “civil 
religion” based on nationalism and socialism.  In this context the “official,” state-renumerated 
clergy lost its legitimacy early on, and the attempts by the State to by off the Islamists led to a 
gradual renunciation of the aims of “revolutionary Algeria.”
70  Moreover, the creation of FIS was 
the result of an eclectic gathering of various more or less official organizations within the Algerian 
Islamist movement, who could only agree on a platform of “least common denominators” that, 
while it differed in strategy, all still agreed on the end goal of an Islamic State.   
  While one could argues that FIS reacted specifically against the intellectual/ideological 
dominance of the Egyptian-based MB, Francois Burgat argues that “Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb 
and their successors have exercised in the Maghreb such doctrinal domination that it is not 
astonishing that their disciples have conserved to this day the name of their founders.”
71  Elsewhere 
Burgat argues that while Algeria exported students, it imported “the ideas of al-Banna and the 
methods of Qutb.”
72  Thus however looked down-upon were “outside” Islamist movements, we can 
see that the Algerian salafi movement, which saw its roots in the works of Ibn Taymiyya, Afghani, 
Abduh and Rida, had at their roots cultural aims, such as the “decolonization of Algerian history,” 
Arabization, and the propagation of an Islamic morality viewed as the only “immunizing guarantee” 
capable of defending society from the corrupting influence of the West.
73  Once the Iranian 
Revolution occurred the writings of Mawdudi and Qutb became more prominent, “at the heart of 
Salafi propaganda,” and not surprising, saw as its goal in the establishment of FIS the domination of 
the educational and social terrain.
74   
  More specifically, by the end of 1989 the FIS, along with two other parties—one secular and 
one Berber-based—had come on the scene to challenge the FLN.  Soon after, a moderate Islamist 
party with the acronym HAMAS (Islamic Movement for an Islamic Society) was created too, along 
with another religious party, the Parti du Renouveau algérien (PRA) or Algerian Renewal Party.  
Along with the parties came a flourishing and free press, which included the FIS organs el 
Mounquid in Arabic and some French, and the French language el-Forkane.  
  The more radical members, led by Abbassi Madani, wanted to achieve political power. In 
fact, there are three groups within FIS that competed for power and which had hegemony within the 
movement at different times—the preacher’s (in fact, as often, teachers/professors) group, or the 
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theose who seized control of the FIS during the summer of 1991.
75  Thus it is difficult to speak of 
FIS as if there was one such coherent and homogeneous organization!  Each tendency is quite 
different in its orientation, with the second group much closer to the Egyptian al-Jama‘a al-
Islamiyya in its use of violence, while the Islamo-technocrats are mostly composed of the first post-
independence college-educated generation, whose islamization occurred at the same time they were 
receiving francophone training in the sciences, such as engineering and medicine. 
  The “preachers” generation generally eschewed politics in line with the traditional MB 
doctrine, while the Islamo-technocrat generation specifically entered partisan politics with the goal 
of capturing the state, and the radicals sought to overthrow it violently.  That is, the former two 
groups at least recognize a state, whereas the radicals see themselves as an alternative to the modern 
nation-state structure.  Indeed, the two principal leaders, Ben Haj and Madani, are radically 
different in where they come from—the university trained competitor of the elite and someone 
expressing popular despair using the FIS for collective salvation.; the FIS “has been the point of 
intersection of very heterogeneous social and political demands.”
76 
 
If one can claim as does M’hammed Moukhobza, that the post-colonial Algerian State was 
responsible for the “abnormal inversion of social hierarchies,” so much more would be the fault 
attributable to 130 years of French colonial rule of the country.
77  While the FLN hoped to harness 
the energies of the Algerian nation to fight colonialism, its leaders’ endemic infighting and 
divisions, coupled with French military power and its own ambivalent filial relationship (culturally, 
intellectually, and even politically) to France prevented the articulation and implementation of a 
coherent ideology and comprehensive program, a problem that would prove crucial for the 
formation of le FIS decades later.
78 
  There is a clear ambivalent and even paradoxical relationship between the FLN and France.  
On the one hand, during the long negotiations (and continued war) the FLN developed a hardened 
position vis-à-vis France and its culture, calling in the Tripoli Program of June 1962 for “a new 
definition of culture” as “national, revolutionary, and scientific,” that could achieve the necessary 
revolutionary transformation of society while somehow remaining compatible with Islam.
79  Yet an 
even more foundational document suggests a closer connection; in that the first negotiating 
positions I the Proclamation of 1 November 1955 declared that “French cultural and economic 
interests, honestly acquired, will be respected…”
80   
  Not surprisingly, the “post-colonial” Algerian-French relationship was based, admittedly, on 
close and “friendly cooperation” and obvious tutelage by the mother country to its “independent” 
daughter.  Similarly, the motivating French ideology vis-à-vis its relations with Algeria (and indeed, 
with the world at large) was one of “mondialisme,” or globalism.
81  And it was closest to home—
i.e., in Algeria—that this mondialisme was to be expressed; thus throughout the post-colonial period 
the goal of French and Algerian governments alike was an exemplary relationship that could ensure 
“codevelopment,” as the Mitterran Government termed it.   
  As Benjamin Sotra argues, the failure by both France and Algeria to recognize and report 
truthfully the history of colonialism and the War of Independence produced a festering, gangrenous 
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82  This was aggravated by the (em)migrant labor 
situation and the beurs, which produced a liminal condition between the two nations and cultures 
that could not be addressed adequately by either one, producing an “unhomeliness” that is, not 
surprising, the hallmark of both the colonial and global moments (and which is epitomized by the 
position of the harkis—the Sioux of France—whose split personality symbolized the inhterent 
tensions in postcolonial Algerian and French identities alike. 
  Such ambivalence would be capitalized on by the Algerian ulama, particularly as the 
socialist ideology came to dominate the State’s public discourses.  In critiquing the FLN’s Marxist 
rhetoric, the question was raised of “what sense can one give to independence if our personality is 
not independent.”
83  This is a crucial insight, for the concept of the “personality” is a constant 
refrain in later Islamist critiques of the dangers of Western culture through globalization, as I have 
elsewhere examined.
84 
  To meet this challenge, in 1986, the Algerian Government “enriched” its National Charter 
through an appeal to “self-reliance,” with a state (re)defined as “popular in essence, Islamic in 
religion, socialist in orientation, democratic in institutions and modern in vocation.”
85  The problem 
with this formula is specifically that any attempt by a “post” colonial nation to be modern is 
doomed to fail, as colonialism is at the heart of the modern project, informing the development of 
capitalism, nationalism, and modernity at large.  That is, Modernity “was imposed” in Algeria.
86  
And the price of this modernity is especially reflected in the cultural political and the cultural 
implications of political economies created by the states in the region.
87 
  What is most important for our purposes is that the burgeoning Islamist movement of the 
late 1980s and early 1990s—and indeed, their forefathers going back to Al-Afghani and even al-
Jabarti—understood the impossibility of a postcolonial modernity, especially one dependent on the 
good graces of the metropole.  Thus the continued close relationship with France, which as we have 
seen was actually strengthened by the weakening Algerian economy, was viewed as an attempt to 
“de-Islamize” the country, as a “cultural aggression,” and as perpetuating French colonial aims “one 
and a half centuries of colonization.”
88  Here we see a sentiment that is quite similar to the fear by 
Hamas of Israeli cultural imperialism.  And other clerics would comment that without total cultural 
independence their could be not real independence. 
 
  One method the Government attempted to address this problem was to enact an Arabization 
law in 1990, but neither this attempt nor the Gulf War of 1990-91 would distract from the 
democratization-cum-Islamization process.  Thus as tensions and even fighting increased between 
the Government and protesters, FIS leaders were arrested for threatening state security at the same 
time that national elections were called for December 1991.  When they were finally held, the FIS 
won an astounding 188 seats, 28 short of an outright majority of the parliament.  While only 47.5 
percent of eligible Algerians voted, it still clearly demonstrated their overwhelming power in 
society.   
  While the FIS economic program did not alarm French business (especially the oil/gas 
consortiums) the French Government was quite worried, and the Pourvoir even more so—although 
not, it should be mentioned, many of the leaders of the opposition, who supported allowing the 
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coup in January 1992 to head off the second round of voting, where the FIS was expected to secure 
an outright majority in parliament, with which it could have threatened the very existence of the 
Pourvoir, let alone its power and prerogatives.
90  Needless to say, the tepid French response to the 
coup only strengthened the anger against France, and the West at large, by the Islamists for their 
tacit support for a blatant disregard of democracy.  Indeed, the lukewarm response to the crisis by 
leading French intellectuals contrasts greatly with the public role of people like Sartre, de Beauvoir, 
Jeanson, and other leading intellectuals during the War of Independence, and reflected the deep-
seated liberal/Left French bias against all things Islamic. 
  What is most important about this whole process is that it reflected an “epistemic drift” in 
Algerian society that resulted from the failure of the country’s political elite ever to secure a 
“consensual national identity.”
91  Such cultural drift is a central feeling of the unhomeliness of 
globalization.  As the Algerian Islamic Rachid Benaissa explains, “the Muslim is in the first place a 
cultural entity… Here, in Algeria, a veritable cultural distress has occurred.  We have been 
subjected, after colonialism, to a veritable ideological rape.”
92 
 
IV. Assessing the Role of Culture in the Ideology of Each Movement and the Larger Conflicts 
in Which They Have Been Involved 
In assessing the role of culture in the ideology and activities of each movement we need to 
understand that a large segment of their supporters are “instrumentalist” in their allegiance to and 
utilization of their services and ideologies; that is, they have gravitated to them because of their 
(seemingly) greater success and/or relevance against continued occupation and or neo-colonial 
policies, and particularly in the case of Hamas, for the social, welfare and educational services it 
provides.  For this reason, it is not sufficient just to limit oneself to a textual examination but rather 
must engage the empirical sociological/anthropological literature on them, scanty though it is.  A 
major goal of this project is clearly, then, to produce the kind of new empirical knowledge that can 
help scholars and policy-makers make better sense of the rhetorical/ideological texts of the two 
movements.  
  What a close reading of the various texts of the two movements does confirm is the 
importance of culture as a motivating factor in their ideologies and policies.  Thus in Algeria the 
return to Islam began in the 1970s, a moment when Islam, which had always remained part of the 
culture, began to grow stronger through its specific emphasis on protecting the Algerian-cum-
Muslim “personality” against the continuing cultural invasion of the West.
93  Indeed, it is clear that 
the great expansion in the number of mosques in Algeria during the 1980s was a cultural response 
to the political-economic deterioration in the country,
94 and thus the cultural arms of the mosques 
played an increasingly prominent role in combating the deleterious influences of the West
95  
Moreover, the mosques were a direct response to the “communists and atheists” that were felt to be 
increasingly dominating Algerian society.  
  If we turn to Palestine, the ultra-violent Islamic Jihad, which was founded several prior to 
Hamas by a break away faction of the MB, argued that “it is futile for the Islamist to dream of 
complete independence of a comprehensive civilizational revival while the center of colonial 
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pleases , and hell-bent on imposing “the Israel era” in our region”
96  Thus the battle for Palestine 
was a battle for Islam and against the colonial legacy.  In this sense it was also against the 
nationalism that inherited this legacy, and thus of modernity at large.
97 
  Islamic Jihad further explains that “the Jew in Israel is an integral part of a modern, 
materialistic culture, or rather, he is its true essence, who possesses its tools, its way of life, values 
and methods, and who supports it totally… On the other sides stands a human being… on whose 
face they tried to put the mask of the Western culture, without being able to fit the mask around the 
original features. 
  Similarly, culture was a central component of what motivated Hamas.  In an early 1988 
leaflet directed to the “Palestinian Muslim woman,” Hamas explains that “after their usurpation of 
Palestine, the Israeli occupation has mobilized all its energies for working to stabilizing its feet in 
our sacred land for the subterfuge of the judaization of the land, of the people and of the identity of 
Palestinians.  The major part of their plan is to work to raise up an effeminate and numb/sluggish 
young generation, a young generation corrupt in its morals and its religion.  That is the objective of 
the complete judaization…” with women and their debasement being the key point of entry for 
this.
98   
  Moreover, when one mixes together accusations of “infidelity” and excoriations of “the 
great satans” (the US and the Soviet Union in this case), you have a potent cultural brew with which 
to raise public/popular consciousness about the severity and scope of the threat facing the people 
(i.e., more than just the Israeli usurpation of Palestinian land).
99  This is further reflected in the 
constant focus of institutional and organization energy on students and universities in the da‘wah 
activities prior to and recruitment for the intifada.
100  Even Palestinian prisoners became cultural 
symbols, as Muslim organization would complain that Palestinian prisoners were forced to allow 
their nails and their hair to grow long, which are the symbols of “their civilization.”
101 
  As I mentioned in the introduction, the rise of FIS in Algeria greatly encouraged Hamas.  In 
fact, the Hamas leadership sent Abbasi Madani, one of FIS’ senior leaders, a congratulatory letter 
after FIS’ stunning electoral victory in 1990 describing the victory as a source of moral support for 
the Palestinian intifada.  In fact, Hroub argues that the increasing growth of Political Islam in 
Algeria had important influence on Palestinian Islam, demonstrating that it was part of a broader 
phenomenon, not sui generis.
102   
  What is clear, however, is that the growing power of the Islamists in Algeria, and also 
Sudan, encouraged the minds and spirits of Hamas members, as along with the Iranian revolution 
and growing Islamist power in Jordan made them feel that a shift in the balance of power in favor of 
Islam (and thus, in their favor) was on the way.  As the Charter explains: “We must train the 
Muslim generation in our area, an Islamic training that depends on performing the religious 
obligations, studying the book of Allah very well, the Prophetic narration, the Islamic history and 
heritage… and using the curriculum that will provide the Muslim with the correct world view in 
ideology and thought.”  (Hamas Charter, Article 16).  In this vein, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, one of the 
movement’s founders and today its spiritual leader, called from the start for a transformation of 
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and presence in the bugeoning “Islamic” public sphere.
103   
  Thus for Hamas “links remain strong with Islamic groups in Algeria, it is there where 
Hamas receives a great deal of its empowerment due to the active role by Islamists in the Algerian 
political process.  Hamas views the Islamists in Algeria as role models whose work energizes the 
movement’s supporters, the clash between the Islamists and the central Government in Algeria is 
almost always used by Hamas as a justificatory tool in motivating its members to unite and to be 
more active.  The crackdown on the Islamists by the Algerian Government and isolating them from 
the Algerian electorate is what enabled Hamas to provide a rationale for its program in opposition to 
the status quo.”
104 
  We have already seen that the FIS discourse was imbued with cultural resonance and 
symbols.  I need to examine more writings of Hamas to determine if its leaders ever specifically 
discussed cultural issues in their communiqués and pamphlets, apart from the general references to 
it in the Charter and the cultural basis of the da‘wa aspect of their mission, or if they were 
specifically influenced by Algerian or Tunisian Islamist thinking (i.e., Ghannouchi), or even 
Turabi’s writings. 
  Another case where Hamas’ rhetoric recalls other Islamist discourses is its view of the 
United States an “imperialist power” and the US-support for Israel as part of the larger ongoing 
project of Western imperialism, as explained in Article 22 of the Charter.  Thus one leader talks 
about the “peace process” as intending “to zionise the Palestinian problem and the Arab nation as 
well as the Islamic world.”
105  This is clearly related to the larger Arab/Muslim critical literature on 
globalization, and particularly on the Peresian vision for the New Middle East, which sees Israel as 
the spearhead for the renewed “cultural invasion” of the region by amoral hyper-consumerist 
capitalism. 
  As one senior Hamas figure explained, “We know that Palestine will become a bridge for 
Israel to penetrate the Arab world economically, politically and culturally and we worry that one of 
the secret provisions is that the PLO have accepted to be a tool of oppression against the Islamic 
current as is now the case in Tunis, Algeria, Egypt and throughout the world…”
106  As I have 
elsewhere demonstrated, the notion of “penetration” is crucial in Arab/Muslim critiques that focus 
on culture, and is indeed crucial to the mechanics of colonial modernity which preceded it.
107 
  If we look more closely at the foundational Hamas document, Chapter Two, Article 9 of the 
Hamas Chater explains that Hamas “evolved in a time where the lack of the Islamic spirit has 
brought about distorted judgment and absurd comprehension.  Values have deteriorated (my 
emphasis)… The goal of the Islamic Resistance Movement therefore is to conquer evil, break its 
will and annihilate it so that truth may prevail… and so that the call may be broadcast over the 
minarets proclaiming the Islamic state.”  Such sentiments have led Hisham Ahmad to conclude that 
“there is a strong social message in these ideas which appeal to a broader base than religion 
alone.”
108  At the same time, however, Hamas’ vision has clearly evolved to the more extreme 
Qutubian variant of the MB discourse:  Thus “Islam is its system”—i.e., it seeks not democracy but 
theocracy, not freedom but obedience, not equality but compliance, and allows for tolerance of 
different religions “only in the shadow of Islam.”
109  
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The international context that influenced the emergence of both the FIS and Hamas must be recalled 
at this point.  The mid to late 1980s were a time when it was becoming clear that the Soviet Union 
was on the wane while America’s world hegemony—what one FIS spokesman described to me as 
the dreaded “americanisme”—was quickly becoming the unrivaled dominant world political, 
economic and cultural force.  Both movements, then, arose in the context of the loss of a major 
ideological, and some cases financial, patron for their respective societies. 
  Moreover, they drew on the collapse of the SU to deligitimize the dominant secular political 
order of their societies; in Algeria, the FIS represented a more conservative, free-market/liberal 
economic perspective in contrast to the official socialist discourse, while Hamas criticized the 
Palestinian left for its continued adherence to an ideology without credibility.  Yet both rejected 
American-style capitalism, believing there to be “an inherent enmity between Islam and the way of 
life it entails” and the West.
110  Thus for FIS in particular the mosques were a “space of catharsis” 
from the evils of a modernization gone awry, a space from which one could, in the name of Islamic 
justice, fight against the “confiscations of their land by a State won over by the seductions of 
international atheism.”
111   
  In the mid to late 1990s Hamas’ doctrinal discourse diminished in intensity, its view of the 
conflict evolving to where it perceived it as “a struggle against the alliance of hegemonic 
colonialism and Zionism directed against our entire nation… which finds multifarious expressions 
in the mechanisms of domination.”
112  Here it should be noted the way in which nation—watan—
and nation—ummah—are conflated in this discourse…  And thus the long-standing Arab/Muslim 
view of the link between Zionism and Western imperialism was made more explicit.   
  More specifically, according to Hroub, for Hamas leaders, “imperialism seeks to establish its 
hegemony over the region in order to serve its own political and economic interests and to nip in the 
bud threats to its hegemonic position emanating from the cultural aspects of the Arab nationalist 
movement and from a potential cultural renaissance in the region,” a position that is still clearly 
articulated up to the most recent Arab/Muslim literature on globalization.
113  In fact, Hamas 
specifically states that “the struggle… in Palestine is a cultural struggle for destiny that only can 
end when its cause, Zionist settlement in Palestine, stops.  The belligerent Zionist settler movement 
] complements the Western design to separate the Islamic umma from its cultural roots and to 
impose Zionist-Western hegemony over it thorugh the realization of the Greater Israel plan, so that 
it then can dominate out entire ummah politically and economically.”
114   
  What is central for my concern is how culture is seen as the engine/vehicle for Western 
political and economic hegemony. The same memorandum quoted in the previous sentence also 
describes Israel, “the Zionist enemy, who is associated with the Western Project to bring the Arab 
Islamic ummah under the domination of Western culture, to make it depending on the West, and to 
perpetuate its underdevelopment.”
115  Thus Hamas argued at the signing of the Oslo accords that the 
PLO had “relinquished all our lands, traditions, holy places and culture which Israel has 
usurped.”
116 
  It is this cultural focus which is central, I would argue, to understanding the dialectic of 
interest and ethical principles, morality and politics, forging alliances with non-Muslims versus 
  20strict adherence to Sharia, etc, that define the way Hamas operates in the Palestinian public 
sphere.
117  The need to appear both pragmatic and principled (i.e., to at least hint at the possibility of 
a truce with Israel if it fulfills certain conditions versus the shibboleth of liberating all of Palestine) 
has affected its activities, particularly its socio-educational/charitable, work.
118  It has also 
influenced the three spheres of its activities: Palestinian, Arab and Islamic” (Charter, Article 14).   
  It is clear that by the mid-1990s, as the prospects for significant Israeli withdrawals and 
Palestinian elections on the horizon, Hamas was prepared to more formally enter the Palestinian 
public political sphere through the formation of an “Islamic political party,” support for which came 
mainly from senior figures of the Islamic movement in the Gaza Strip, who were keen on getting a 
foot in the door of electoral politics before the PA could consolidate its position.  The party was 
envisaged as a political arm of the Islamic movement, hence the issue of armed struggle against 
Israel would not be affected.  Crucially, among its main tasks would be provision of a countrywide 
political umbrella for all those Palestinians who agreed with the Islamic vision, and the party would 
separate political, social, and military activities to make such a specifically social-political vision 
possible and in order to play a pivotal role in the relations between the public and the PA, and to 
build a civic society based on the Islamic law (shari`a), and provide social and economic services to 
the public.
119  
  A central effect of this “going public” was the growing pragmatism it reflected, in that while 
the party would struggle for the liberation of all of Palestine and for the right of return, those behind 
it did not define its territorial aims in line with the charter, but rather borrowed the pragmatic goal 
set by Hamas, bringing about a full Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories occupied in 
1967, including the removal of all the Jewish settlements in those territories.  Here we see the 
mainstreaming within the Hamas/Islamic movement of a previously expressed willingness to accept 
a “temporary truce” (hudna) with Israel, though not peace, yet within Palestinian society, would 
respect and push for human rights, freedom of political organization and association, political 
pluralism, and the majority decision in selecting the Palestinian people’s leaders and its 
representatives in “inside” and “outside” institutions.  As important, the draft platform called for an 
effort to remedy the PA’s hostility toward Islam and the Islamic movement and to minimize the 
chances of an armed clash between the two.
120  
  Thus we have arrived at a discursive dynamic whereby a specifically cultural/religious 
politics was, if only for a brief period, seen as a central task of the movement.  This was no doubt an 
inevitable development when the motives for the formation of the movement was the realization 
that the Palestinian struggle is “a question of life or death and a cultural struggle between the Arabs 
and Muslim on one side and Zionism on the other.”
121  Again, “the ongoing conflict… is a fateful 
civilization struggle… Th[e] aggressive [Zionist] enterprise complements the larger Western project 
that seeks to strip the Arab Islamic nation of its cultural roots.”
122 
  Not surprisingly, although much work needs to be done on theorizing the role of gender in 
this discourse, Hamas itself raises it to a central concern vis-à-vis the struggle against 
Western/Israeli culture: “The Muslim woman has a role in the battle for the liberation which is no 
less than the role of the man, for she is the factory of men…  the enemies have realized her role: 
they think that if they are able to direct her and raise her the way they want, far from Islam, then 
  21they have won the battle… You’ll find that they use continuous spending through mass media and 
the motion picture industry.  They also use the education system by way of their teachers who are 
part of Zionist organizations… These are all centers for destruction and destroyers.” (Hamas 
charter, Article 17). 
  What is more surprising is that to combat such a degenerate culture, “Islamic art” has a 
crucial role to play: “Art has rules and standards with which one can determine whether it is Islamic 
or ignorant.  The Islamic Liberation is in need of Islamic art that raises the spirit and does not 
emphasize one aspect of the humanity over the others, bur raises all aspects equally and 
harmoniously.  The human is of a strange makeup, hand full of clay and breathed spirit, Islamic art 
communicates to mankind on this basis.  Ignofrant art communicates to the body and emphasizes 
the clay aspect…  books, articles, newsletters, orations, pamphlets, poetry, songs, plays and other 
matierals, if the specialties of Islamic art are included in it, are necessary for ideological education 
and invigorating nourishment, to continue the struggle and relaxing the spirit because the struggle is 
long and the toil is hard.  The souls will be bored and Islamic art revives the vigor, imparts 
excitement and invokes in the soul the high spirits and correction deliberation” (Hamas Chater, 
Article 19). 
 
Some Examples from Hamas Literature 
Aside from pamphlets, leaflets, newspaper and other media for distributing information and 
propaganda, Hamas-allied writers and clerics have written several books which reflect the overall 
ideological orientation of the movement.  Thus far I have been able to obtain to of these important 
works, which I will presently discuss.   
  The first is al-Intifada al-mubaraka wa mustaqbiluha, by Jihad Muhammad Jihad (clearly a 
pseudonym).  Written in the year after the outbreak of the intifada (1988), the book recounts the 
exploits of the “heroic” fighters against the occupation and criticizes Israel for its policies, and 
indeed for its very existence.  Most of this is standard Hamas boilerplate, but what is interesting to 
me is the latter part of the book, where the goals of the movement are described.  Here Jihad 
explains that among the most important goals of Hamas is to “lead the masses with its full 
strength… and spread Islamic slogans with the greatest intensity in demonstrations and on the walls 
of cities and villages and camps.”
123  There is a clear realization—if not explicitly discussed as 
such—that in supporting the use of “all means necessary” in order to “cut the Jewish occupation 
from its roots” culture would have to play a major part, especially when “Islam is the one solution 
in front of us.”
124 
  Indeed, Hamas had a two-stage program to realize its strategy: first, to alert the outside 
world to the reality of the Occupation and to motivate the Palestinian masses to use all their power 
to rise up against it; and once this level of consciousness was raised, to focus on internal issues—
that is, to “confirm [for the people] that there is no leader for the people but the mosque and its 
leading men (rijalat).”
125  This could be accomplished because Hamas saw itself as “the only active 
and powerful movement to lead the masses…”
126  Indeed, the intifada itself demonstrated that 
“Islam is the only solution and that the Islamic movement exemplified by Hamas” is the only party 
that can realize an Islamic State in Palestine.
127 
  22  If we turn to Mu‘alim fi tariq ila tahrir filastin, by Ibrahim al-Muqadama, we see a similar 
narrative that brings the importance of culture even further into view.  The very first lines of the 
book describe the “loss/destruction (diy‘a) of identity” as being at the heart of the loss of freedom 
and the loss of Palestine itself.
128  Soon thereafter al-Muqadama argues that the Islamic movement 
is the only force capable of sustaining the struggle to victory, particularly against the quite 
dangerous but often overlooked evil of the “intellectual” and “ethic” “invasion” of the West/Israel 
from the colonial period till today,
129 a similar sentiment to that offered at the beginning of this 
essay. 
  After a lengthy review of the Islamic history of Palestine through the Mandate period that 
focused on the role of Islam and the MB in particular in fighting against the Jews, the book 
“diagnoses” the problems of the Palestinian people as stemming from their moving far from their 
religion; thus only a full and comprehensive return to Islam through a “wide, comprehensive 
program of reform” (one based on the teachings of al-Banna specifically) could precipitate their 
freedom where the nationalist movement had failed.
130  Indeed, the success of the “jihad” preached 
by Hamas is dependent on a “renaissance of the Islamic spirit” among Palestinians.
131 
 
The Role of violence in the Hamas Discourse 
Given that the utilization of extreme violence lies at the heart of Hamas’ rhetoric, ideology and 
activities, we need to ask, What is the nature of a public sphere shaped so profoundly by violence, 
both perpetrated against it and by it?  Hamas leaders seem to have recognized the destabilizing 
effect of uncontrolled violence, especially if it became internecine.  Thus however extreme its 
violence against Israel, from the start it vowed, and has kept this vow, never to use violence against 
other Palestinian groups, including the PA, despite repeated attacks by the latter on it.   
  Indeed, unlike FIS, Hamas was born directly out of violence and it was the direct use of 
violence that led to its rise and success.  This needs to be theorized in more detail, perhaps in 
comparison to Hizballah, which was also born out of extreme violence….  Furthermore, Hamas 
ascribed to Israel and the Jews demonic traits that justified its refusal to hold a dialogue: Israel is a 
“cancer that is spreading… and is threatening the entire Islamic world” (May 3, 1988). The Jews, 
according to another leaflet, are “brothers of the apes, assassins of the prophets, bloodsuckers, 
warmongers…  Only Islam can break the Jews and destroy their dream” (January 1988).  While 
such extreme anti-Jewish rhetoric was tone down over time—although a recent collection of Hamas 
communiqués since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada reveals that the Jewish rather than Zionist 
focus has returned in full force
132—it clearly shaped the way its public sphere developed.   
  Moreover, Hamas often drew on images and events from the history of Islam to underscore 
the religious character of its conflict with Israel and also to substantiate its claim for perseverance 
(thabat, sumud, tamassuk) and faith (iman) in the final victory of Islam, no matter what the current 
difficulties of the Arab and Muslim community (umma) were. To validate its argument that Israel 
was bound to be defeated by Islam, the leaflets of Hamas frequently rehearsed Islam’s great 
victories over its enemies in Palestine, and of course Muhammed’s victory over the wealthy 
Khaybar Jewish community in Medina who according to Muslim tradition had acted with perfidy 
by violating a covenant they signed with him.
133 
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Conclusion: Locating Hamas and FIS within Emerging Paradigms of the Public Sphere  
The understanding of the public sphere grounding this paper, and the larger project, is that of an 
arena and set of discourses whose seminal moment is the incipient processes of State-legitimation 
and efficacy (through discourses of centralized military conscription, education, legal institutions 
and other discourses of public order) that defined pre-modern absolutist Europe.  The spread of 
these processes to the Arab world via colonial modernity intersected with concomitantly developing 
Islamic reform discourses in a manner that would have far reaching consequences for both “Islam” 
and the “nation-state” in the MENA region.   
  The crucial moment in this process is when Muslim/Arab intellectuals adopted and reshaped 
both European-inspired discourses of public order and Islamic notions of morality and normativity 
“to fit their craft;” in so doing they provided Islam with a modern form of “civilizational power” 
modern forms of governmentality that would both help secure the legitimacy of postcolonial states 
and (soon thereafter) offer a direct challenge to them (Salvatore).  Specifically, the islah movement 
recognized the functional competence of the state and a sort of division of labor between the 
political ruling class and the intellectual educational-civilizing class; thus Muslim reformers 
supported modern courts, codification, civil law and the “civilizing” logic immanent in them as 
nurturing both their projects and their social power of public educators.   
  As Salvatore informs us, “Islamic morality” in Egypt was explicitly (re)designated to be a 
“modern technique of control and education” (through the reformulation of concepts such as 
hisba/ihtisab and even the shari‘a itself,
134 while “traditional virtues [we]re packaged in the form of 
a Muslim morality now deemed essential for the civic education.”  Moreover, there emerges a 
“calibrated, but not unconditioned loyalty of the reformers to political authority, as long as the latter 
legitimized itself through adequately drawing on the education and disciplining blueprint 
formulated by the intellectuals.”
135  
  Here we see the complementary role of the public sphere in a manner that likely challenged 
and frustrated as much as encouraged (as understood in the Hegelian-Habermasian tradition) the 
attempts by actors within civil society to use the same epistemological and political energy and 
tools to check growing State power—The public sphere, “defined by a relatively free press, a 
flourishing publishing industry, literary salons, open public lectures, night schools, and a vibrant 
associational life made up of scientific and welfare societies,” was not a buffer between the state in 
society, but rather the former’s partner (in some ways junior, in some ways senior) in the 
disciplining and normalizing the emerging modern subjects.   
  Thus, in Egypt, the concept of adab is reconfigured to denote an autonomous field of 
morality (and as important, shared civility), based on the duties of man to God and the nation, that 
would be inculcated primarily through proper education.  Indeed, discourses of education are a 
focus of Egyptian reformers from ‘Abdallah al-Nadim to Mustafa Mahmud (cf. Salvatore).  As 
important, these chapters remind us that the Egyptian public sphere was situated in a larger 
“transcultural” public sphere that reflected relationship of increasing (colonial) domination as the 
emerging Egyptian educating class interacted with European Orientalist discourses. 
  24  With this understanding of the roots of the larger Arab/Muslim public sphere in the late 19
th 
century colonial period, we are in a position to question how late 20
th century colonial Palestine 
compares to the originary framework.  From Hamas’ perspective the answer is simple: “Part of 
social welfare in providing aid to everyone who is need of it, be it material, or spiritual, or collective 
cooperation to complete some works.” (Hamas Chater, Article 21.)   
  Yet interestingly, from the standpoint of Hamas, the topic of the public sphere would seem 
to be a delicate one for at least some representatives.  Thus when asked about whether Hamas had 
provided systematic services to mobilize the population and if so what institutions facilitated these 
activities, a senior Hamas official, Jamil Hamameh, “would not answer this question directly but 
instead gave a general answer incorporating all movements.”
136  It would seem, perhaps, that much 
of Hamas “public” power stems from the nebulous and ill-defined structure and rules of the 
Palestinian public sphere under Occupation; a situation that allows Hamas great leeway in moving 
between its social and political/military visions, goals ands strategies; but I need to do more 
research on why they would be hesitant to discuss their leading role in public services and 
education/welfare activities, especially when it is so widely reported. 
  Another important factor in understanding both the evolution of the Palestinian public 
sphere and Hamas’ role in is the fact that after the Gulf War thousands of Palestinians forced out of 
the Gulf countries and returned to the Gaza Strip, where the more conservative cultural/religious 
outlook of Hamas was quite close to what they had been exposed to in the Gulf.  The role of these 
returnees, politically, culturally and of course economically, in shaping the ideology, power and 
programs of Hamas, needs to be explored further.  What is clear from the historical record is that in 
the 1980s the focus of the Mujamma‘ on developing a civil society by forming voluntary 
associations and other open communal activities acted as a kind of security valve in relation to the 
Israeli authorities.  This must be contextualized vis-à-vis Israel’s tacit consent to the great expansion 
of mosques in Gaza and their role as sanctuaries, where they became an ideal venue for various 
public activities, safe from Israeli interference.  What this dynamic tell us, I believe, is that the MB 
enjoyed a clear advantage over the nationalist forces represented by the PLO even before the 
creation of Hamas.  
 
There are many areas of comparison between Hamas and FIS that I would like to explore as my 
research continues.  To begin with, like FIS, Hamas continuously vowed to “adhere to whatever the 
people choose;” i.e., they wanted to join the internal political process and vowed (and have kept this 
promise) never to use violence within the Palestinian political process and to respect absolutely the 
will of the people, even if it is at odds with their views.  It is worth noting that while many of the 
FIS’ critics have questioned its commitment to democracy as mere rhetoric that would have been 
abandoned once they secured power, I have not seen such accusations against Hamas within the 
context of Palestinian politics. 
  Another important area of comparison for Hamas is to the Islamic movement within Israel.  
It is important to note that if in the OT the Islamic movement made a transition from proselytizing 
and educational activities in the days of the Muslim Brotherhood to armed struggle after Hamas 
came on the scene, within Israel the Islamic movement took the opposite tact, going from a brief 
  25period of armed struggle in the early 1980s to contesting political campaigns, proselytizing, and 
offering educational services…
137  “Hamas carved out a distinctive niche for itself on the 
Palestinian political scene by accepting ideological pluralism and by conducting itself in conformity 
with a pragmatic agenda.”
138  Yet at the same time violence was from the start the main marker of 
its distinct identity within the Palestinian and external contexts. 
  But while Hamas never participated in national elections within the framework of the Oslo 
peace process, we can still measure the societal power of Hamas vis-à-vis other social groups 
through the numerous local, professional and university elections.  Thus for example Hroub has 
reviewed the available polling and election data and concludes that Hamas has the support of 
around thirty percent of the Palestinian population.  However, many of these supporters would be 
hesitant to vote for it, indeed “unlikely [to] vote for Hamas.  More precisely, voters’ hearts may be 
with Hamas, but they will vote for the PLO or to support the PA,” because of an assessment of the 
realizability of the maximalist Hamas vision versus the more pragmatic one of the PA.
139   
  On the other hand, in the wake of the harsh violence of the last two years since Hroub made 
this assessment, fresh research is needed as to how “public” the public support for Hamas would be 
in the contact of electoral politics.  Moreover, Hroub does not tell us who the “thirty percent” are; 
their gender, class, clan, geographical, educational, professional and other data without which such 
assessments are not that helpful. 
  What we do know with some certainty, however, is that if we examine Hamas’ goal of 
“fortifying society” through a level of Islamic preparation necessary to undertake continuous 
struggle, the attraction of the movement would come from the perceived integrity, Islamic ethics 
and honesty with which it engages in such essentially social/charitable activities.  This is especially 
important in comparison to the clear corruption (and worse) of the PA.  This piety and 
upstandingness helps Hamas spread its message, done through its periodic statements and other 
communiqués, stressing religious observance, modesty for women and men, and relating personal 
and societal religious piety with the resistance against the occupation.  This then was tied to more 
“interpersonal relations” such as condemning corruption and deviant behavior and encouraging 
thriftiness and social solidarity and self-reliance economically 
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